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Fundamental Rights not so Fundamental? Critique of the Supreme Court
Judgment in Law Association of Zambia v. the Attorney General

Muna B. Ndulo and Samuel Ngure Ndungu
(Cornell Law School)

The article discusses the constitutionality of sections 5 and 6 of the Public Order Act of Zambia. The
Law Association of Zambia had unsuccessfully argued in the High Court of Zambia that the sections
violated section 20 (Freedom of expression) and 21 (Freedom of assembly) of the Zambian
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Zambia upheld the decision of the High Court and held that the
sections did not violate sections 20 and 21 of the constitution and were constitutional. This article
argues that the Supreme Court decision is wrong and falls short of effectively protecting citizen’s
rights of peaceful assembly and expression. It argues that the Supreme Court failed to realise that
section 5 (6) fundamentally operates as a limitation on the constitutional rights of citizens to
peaceful assembly and expression.

1. Introduction
The Supreme Court of Zambia Judgment in Law Association of Zambia v the Attorney
General, Appeal No. 08/2014 was on a challenge to the constitutionality of Sections 5 and 6
of the Public Order Act. The Law Association had unsuccessfully argued in the High Court
that these sections violated Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of Zambia, and this was
an appeal seeking to overturn the decision of the High Court dismissing its petition. In
essence, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the Public Order Act, as
amended by Act No. 36 of 1996 is constitutional. The Court opined that the amendment had
addressed the concerns expressed in the Mulundika judgment – to wit, that the police
cannot deny permits to people who apply to hold a public demonstration. The Court
however found that Section 5 (6) of the Act fell short of the constitutional threshold, as it
does not give the police an obligation to suggest a ‘reasonable alternative date in the very
near future,’ and that the police had used this loophole to constructively deny people their
right to protest.
In this article, we argue that this judgment falls short of effectively protecting
citizen’s rights of peaceful assembly and expression. First, it suffers from the same
weaknesses as the Mulundika judgment – in that it does not fully appreciate the nature of
the right of assembly and the freedom of expression. Secondly, it does not adequately
capture all aspects of constructive denial that are brought about by the 1996 amendment to
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the Public Order Act, specifically by Section 5(6) and its lack of guidelines for the police,
which makes the section fundamentally unconstitutional. The Court fails to realise that
Section 5 (6) fundamentally operates as a limitation on the constitutional rights to peaceful
assembly and expression.
2. Weakness of the Mulundika Judgment Replicated
The 1996 amendment to the Public Order Act goes a long way in enhancing the protection
to the freedom of peaceful assembly and expression. Language in the Public Order Act
empowering the police to control who can talk at the assembly, the duration of the
assembly and the content that can be discussed at the assembly1 is replaced with a
notification to the police on the date, duration and location of the assembly, whether it be a
static one or a demonstration/protest that follows a path.2 However, there remains an
undertone that the rights of peaceful assembly must be policed – that they are subject to
the police’s ability to police them and that the police can deny or cancel a permit on the
grounds that the police cannot police the assembly.3 This detracts from the fundamental
nature of the right.
The right of peaceful assembly is recognised as a fundamental right worldwide.
Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) specifies that
no restrictions may be placed on the right, except those that are ‘necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of
public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 4 Similarly
Article 11 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights provides that: ‘Every
individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right shall
be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law, in particular those enacted in
the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of
others.’5 As we demonstrate, there is consensus worldwide that the right to peaceful
assembly and expression are fundamental to political speech. This is why they are viewed
as fundamental in a democratic society, where views that may only be held by a minority
may not find expression in other fora, leading to the necessity of peaceful assembly and
expression within the assembly. Legal restrictions or ‘clawbacks’6 are allowed in the
Previous Section 5 (5) of the Public Order Act.
Section 5 (5) as amended.
3 This is the import of Section 5 (6) of the Public Order Act, which allows police to prohibit a public meeting
because they are unable to police it.
4 Article 21, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
5 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1979.
6 R. Goodrick, The Right of Peaceful Protest in International Law and Australian Obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see:
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUK
EwiqjcSUrMbNAhWHKsAKHVIeCcQFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.humanrights.gov.au%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FHRC_assem
1
2
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interests of keeping the peace, protecting private property, or respecting other people’s
rights (not just sensibilities) and only in those interests.
Something that is immediately noticeable is that Section 5 of the Public Order Act, as
amended, does not meet this threshold set out by the ICCPR. The language of Section 5 does
not limit the restrictions to the freedom of assembly to only those ‘necessary’ for national
security or public safety, public order, health or morality. It is even more telling that the
right of assembly in Article 21 (2) of the Constitution conforms to the ICCPR:
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with
or in contravention of this Article to the extent that it is shown that the law in question makes
provision –
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality
or public health;
(b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the rights or freedoms of other persons;

Section 5 (6) of the Act simply states: ‘Where it is not possible for the Police to adequately
police any particular public meeting,’ the police may inform the conveners of their inability
and suggest an alternative date. What is conspicuously missing from this Act, is that any
restrictions to the freedom of assembly must satisfy the conditions set out in Article 21 of
the Constitution. The inability to police a public meeting is not one such restriction, in and
of itself. It should be shown that should the meeting go on without police presence, there is
a probability, more than a mere possibility, that there would be a breach of the peace as a
result. The test is not subjective, nor one entirely for the police. It must be based on
objective criteria. This is the tenor of the Public Order Act of the UK, which despite having
similarities with the Zambian Act in the requirement of notices to the police for public
processions and assemblies, takes a more serious view of the police power to stop a
procession:
12 Imposing conditions on public processions
(1) If the senior police officer, having regard to the time or place at which and the circumstances in
which any public procession is being held or is intended to be held and to its route or proposed route,
reasonably believes that —
(a) it may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the
life of the community, or
(b) the purpose of the persons organising it is the intimidation of others with a view to compelling
them not to do an act they have a right to do, or to do an act they have a right not to do,
he may give directions imposing on the persons organising or taking part in the procession such
conditions as appear to him necessary to prevent such disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation,
including conditions as to the route of the procession or prohibiting it from entering any public place
specified in the directions.7
bly_Goodrick.doc&usg=AFQjCNHysp6f_ekqmHyT_qAUNMEcwqLQ8g&sig2=9YmMhfi91FqIvpQZLkC4Kw&bv
m=bv.125596728,d.ZGg
7 Public Order Act (UK), 1986, s. 12.
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Such an understanding stems from the fact that the right to peaceful assembly is indeed a
fundamental right; and one that does not need the midwifery of the police. The police are
allowed to step in where the assembly is, for serious reasons, suspected of not being
peaceful. The police cannot prohibit an assembly solely on the ground that no permit was
issued for the assembly. The assumption of the automatic need of a permit for assembly in
the Public Order Act is therefore unwarranted and unconstitutionally abrogates the right to
peaceful assembly.
The mistake here is not just one for the legislature, though. The Supreme Court, both
in the Mulundika case and the LAZ v AG case, has shown a somewhat short-sighted view of
the fundamental nature of the right to peaceful assembly. In Mulundika, the provisions
being subjected to constitutional scrutiny were so egregious, and the Court was largely
cognisant of this. However, it failed to recognise that the power to issue directions must be
constrained to the conditions in the Constitution, those of public peace, morality and the
protection of other people’s property and rights. The Court proceeded on the assumption
that police oversight into the exercise of this right was necessary:
Although not guided by concern for the administrative consequences, we readily accept and
acknowledge that there are many regulatory features in CAP 104 which are perfectly constitutional
and very necessary for the sake of public peace and order. This was common cause. For instance,
there are subsections authorising the issuing of directions and conditions for the purpose of
regulating the route of a procession; the date, place and time of an assembly or a procession; their
duration and any other matter designed to preserve public peace order. These regulatory functions
of the police can only be in the highest interest of peace and order. Though therefore the police can
no longer deny a permit because the requirement for one is about to be pronounced against, they will
be entitled – indeed they are under a duty in terms of the remainder of the Public Order Act – to
regulate public meetings, assemblies and processions strictly for the purpose of preserving public
peace and order.8

In the Judges’ minds, peaceful assembly could not be peaceful without police presence.
In LAZ v AG, the judges harboured the same misconception. In (rightly) upholding
the requirement to give notice to the Police of a public meeting, they wrongly attributed it
to the need for regulatory function of the police over assemblies: ‘In this regard, we hold
the view that the requirement for notice is necessary, as this is the only way that the Police
can perform their regulatory function and maintain law and order in our society.’9 The flaw
in the conception of the fundamental nature of the right is shown, in that the Court sees no
need of presenting an evidentiary burden upon the police to show that they must regulate a
public assembly. Regulation is seen as a foregone conclusion, a necessity for the enjoyment
of a fundamental right. This, therefore, informs the overlooking of the power granted to the
police allowing them to cancel a public meeting and suggest a date in the near future
8
9

Christine Mulundika & 7 Others v The People, 1995 S.J. As per Ngulube, CJ, reading for the Court.
Law Society of Zambia v the Attorney General, Appeal No. SCZ/8/333/2013.
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because they cannot police (regulate) it adequately, without necessarily showing that the
inability to regulate would result in a breach of the peace. This latter approach, of
considering whether the police should regulate at all in the interests of peace is seen in the
EU case of Éva Molnár v Hungary.10 In interpreting Article 21 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, which is identical to Article 21 of the Zambian
Constitution, the Court held that there was no assumption that the policing of a peaceful
assembly was required by the Constitution. Thus, the breaking up of a spontaneous
peaceful assembly, for which notice could not be given, would be an unnecessary
abrogation of the right to peaceful assembly, the Court stated:
However, in special circumstances when an immediate response might be justified, for example in
relation to a political event, in the form of a spontaneous demonstration, to disperse the ensuing
demonstration solely because of the absence of the requisite prior notice, without any illegal conduct
by the participants, may amount to a disproportionate restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly
(...) It is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful
gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention is not to be
deprived of all substance.

The failure of the Supreme Court to appreciate the fundamental nature of the right to
peaceful assembly further blinds it to another flaw in Section 5 (5) (e) of the Public Order
Act. This section outlines one of the conditions that the conveners of the public meeting
have to meet, and which the police may rely upon to justify the cancelation of a planned
public meeting. It reads as follows: ‘that the public meeting, procession or demonstration
shall not create a risk to security or public safety, a breach of the peace or disaffection
amongst the inhabitants of that neighborhood [emphasis added].’ This highlighted
provision in effect gives the police the power to regulate the content of the opinions to be
expressed at a public meeting. Had the Court appreciated the fundamental nature of the
freedom of expression, it would have been clear that such power is incompatible with the
inalienable stature of a fundamental right. While a Constitution can limit the kinds of
expression that are not protected – for example, the Constitution does remove certain
kinds of speech like libel and defamation11 – no such restrictions can be given for
unpopular views. The freedom to air unpopular views is the very essence of the freedom of
speech and assembly. Two American cases illustrate this. In Edwards v South Carolina,12
the US Supreme Court held that a State could not ‘make criminal the peaceful expression of
unpopular views.’ In National Socialist Party v Village of Skokie,13 the Supreme Court
upheld an Illinois Supreme Court decision that would not ban the Nazi Party from
organising a peaceful protest because of the content of their message. Closer to home, the
Application no. 10346/05, ECHR (7 January 2009).
Article 21 (3) (b), Constitution of Zambia.
12 372 US 229 (1963).
13 473 US 43 (1977).
10
11
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Kenyan High Court, in a recent case, underscored the important part that the freedom of
assembly plays in the ventilation of unpopular views:
It may very well be that the opinion or view is an unpopular one with others but yet again, freedom
of assembly merely provides an alternative form of participating in democracy to those who may be
disenchanted and uninspired in one way or another. A minority may, for example, feel disappointed
by their own failure to convince the majority. The alternative avenue for expressing their view would
simply then be through demonstrations and picketing, even though the minority may still not have
their way.14

As the Harvard Law Review in an article analysing the regulation of demonstrations in the
United States noted:
Often a demonstration has significant publicity advantages over more conventional media of
expression since it can attract extensive news coverage and widespread public interest; and for
persons unpopular or unknown to the general public, or without financial resources, a
demonstration may be the only effective means to publicize a message or reach a desired audience. 15

These views are in stark contrast to both the Act and the Zambian Supreme Court’s
judgment in that the ‘disaffection’ of locals in the locale of a planned protest is not grounds
enough for the abrogation of a right, no matter how odious the opinion that causes the
disaffection. The importance of these decisions is that the freedom of expression and
assembly are cornerstones of democracy, as they ensure that minority, unpopular views
are not drowned by the hum of the majority. The police have an obligation to protect
people expressing unpopular views. That the Supreme Court fails to apprehend this is truly
unfortunate.
3. Unfettered Discretion of Police
The amended section 5 outlines numerous conditions for the holding of an assembly and
the applicants have to wait for police authorisation before they can proceed to hold an
assembly. Section 5 gives the police the absolute power of determining whether or not an
assembly, meeting or procession should take place. The Supreme Court did rightly state
that the right to assembly cannot be denied. However, the Court fails to identify that the
right can still be abrogated if the police are allowed to cancel a public assembly without
proper guidelines, as established by the Constitution. The Court seems to think that it is
clear from the Act that the reasons to be given for the cancellation of a peaceful assembly
are only those in the Constitution. However, as already illustrated, the language of Section 5
of the Public Order Act expands the reasons for cancelling an assembly to beyond those in
14

Hon. Ferdinand Ndung’u Waititu & 4 others v The Attorney General & 9 Others , Petition No. 169 of 2016, as

per Onguto J.
15 1967 HLR 1773.
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the Constitution – those of maintaining public peace and protecting other people’s rights
and properties. In fact, the language of the Act does not even limit the reasons why the
police can cancel a planned assembly – it only states that they can cancel an assembly out of
an inability to police it. Apart from the foundational arguments already made, this scenario
is clearly not envisaged by the Constitution – that an individual, whoever that might be,
should be made the sole and unquestionable determinant of what is reasonably justifiable
for the entire citizenry of Zambia. The Constitution does not in any way intend that the
enjoyment of rights and freedoms enshrined by it in articles 20, 21 and 28 be conditioned
or contingent on the opinion of an official of the executive arm of government. A law which
confers discretion on a public official without indicating with sufficient precision the limits
of that discretion does not satisfy the quality of the ‘law’ contemplated in article 21 by the
requirements of prescribed law.
This same view obtains in the Ghanaian Supreme Court. It held in New Patriotic
Party vs. Attorney-General that ‘restrictions as are provided by article 21(4) of the 1992
constitution may be necessary from time to time and upon proper occasion. But the right to
assemble, protest or demonstrate cannot be denied.’16 The Ghana Supreme Court nullified
section 12 (a) of the Public Order Decree,17 which gave police officers unfettered discretion
to stop and cause to be dispensed any meetings or processions in any public place in
contravention of sections 7 and 8; and section 13(a) which made it an offence to hold such
processions, meetings and public celebrations without permission. Similarly, the Court of
Appeal in Nigeria, in Inspector-General of Police v. All Nigerian Peoples Party and Others,
after holding the permit system under the Nigerian Public Order Act unconstitutional
stated: ‘constitutions should be interpreted in such a manner as to satisfy the yearnings of
the Nigerian Society.’ The court observed:
Public Order Act should be promulgated to compliment section 39 and 40 of the constitution in
context and not to stifle or cripple it. A rally or placard-carrying demonstration has become a form of
expression of views on current issues affecting government and the governed in a sovereign state. It
is a trend recognized and deeply entrenched in the system of governance in civilized countries. It will
not only be primitive but also retrogressive if Nigeria continues to require a pass to hold a rally. We
must borrow a leaf from those who have trekked the rugged path of democracy and are now reaping
the dividend of their experience.18

In re Munhumeso,19 the Zimbabwe Supreme Court held that powers placed in the hands of
the police are arbitrary where (a) there is no criterion to be used to regulate the authority
in the exercise of its discretion, (b) the regulating authority is not obliged to take into
account whether the likelihood of a breach of peace could be averted by attaching
1992-93 GBR 585-(2000) 2HBLRA, 1.
Public Order Decree, 1972(NRCD).
18 (2) 18 NWLR 457 C.A.
19 1994(1) ZLR 49(s).
16
17
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conditions such as time, duration and route, and (c) it allows refusal of a permit even on
the slightest possibility of breach of peace. This approach is supported by case law
elsewhere in the world. In the US case of Shuttleworth v. Birmingham,20 where by
legislation the city commission has been granted power to refuse permission for a
procession on such vague criteria as ‘public welfare, safety, health, decency and public
morals’, the Court held that such a power created an avenue for arbitrariness. It struck
down the legislation. Similarly, in Gregory v. Florida21 a statute which gave the police
almost unlimited discretion to decide whether or not demonstrators had committed a
‘diversion tending to a breach of peace’ was declared an unconstitutional interference with
the freedom of assembly. In Shuttleworth22 the Court stated that the test required for the
restricting law is an objective one and should not depend on the subjective view or opinion
of a police officer.
The lack of a precise standard for the police to abide by when considering whether
to abridge the right to peaceful assembly is therefore particularly damning. Unlike the
judges in Mulundika, it is contended that this makes Section 5 (6) of the Public Order Act
open to arbitrary enforcement, as the police are not required explicitly by the Act to justify
that their ‘inability to Police’ a planned public meeting or demonstration will lead to a
breach of peace, should the planned meeting go on without police supervision. This is
contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution, and is not justifiable in an open and democratic
country, as has been established by the review of case law from other jurisdictions.
4. Conclusion
The Supreme Court erred in finding that the only way Section 5 (6) of the Act offended the
Constitution is by not providing for a strict timeline for the police’s postponement of a planned
meeting. In doing so, the Court validated the untenable situation where the police, in conforming to
the Act, do not have to justify (implying an evidentiary burden) that a lack of police supervision of
an event would probably lead to a breach of the peace. In addition, they can cancel a planned
meeting because of the potential of the planned protests offending the sensibilities of the local
residents – which in essence refers to the police licensing the content of the message of the protest.
The gravest error, however, lies in the Court not apprehending the inalienable and fundamental
nature of a fundamental human right. The Court sees the midwifery of the right to peaceful
assembly by the police as a foregone conclusion, a necessary regulatory function.

(1969) 394 US 147.
(1969) 394 US 111.
22 Supra note 17.
20
21
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